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ABSTRACT 
Commentators have argued that employees should be compensated 
in the event of a hostile takeover; otherwise, the threat of such a takeover 
will fail to incentivize firm-specific investments by employees. Such de-
ferred compensation is analogous to the payment of damages following a 
breach of contract. The analogous breach, here, is the breach of an im-
plicit contract between management and employees. Employees trusted 
management to compensate them for firm-specific investments not explic-
itly contracted for. 
I use a familiar result from the contract law literature: There is no 
measure of damages for breach of contract that can generate both effi-
cient breach and efficient investment by parties to the relationship. While 
zero damages results in an inefficiently high likelihood of breach, expec-
tation damages result in too much investment. Similarly, in the hostile 
takeover context, no measure of ex post compensation to employees can 
generate efficient takeovers from outside bidders and efficient firm-
specific investment by employees. Measures of compensation that incen-
tivize only those takeovers that are efficient will lead to overreliance, i.e., 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The first half of 2014 witnessed resurgence in the use of hostile tac-
tics in takeover activity.1 Consider the following three examples. First, 
Pfizer recently made a $119 billion hostile bid for their British competi-
tor, AstraZeneca.2 Second, around the same time, Endurance Specialty 
Holdings sought to buy Aspen Insurance Holdings, but after friendly ne-
gotiations broke down, Endurance employed hostile tactics.3 Third, Va-
leant Pharmaceuticals put forward an unsolicited proposal to buy Aller-
gan for $53 billion.4 Hostile takeovers are making a comeback, repre-
senting seven percent of global offer volume—the highest since 2007.5 
Increased shareholder activism in recent years may be contributing 
to the use of hostile takeovers. If the Valeant bid for Allergan is any in-
dication, a trend toward increased cooperation between activist share-
holders and hostile bidders may be on the horizon. This hostile activity—
along with the rise in shareholder activism more generally—may reopen 
the discussion of how hostile tactics affect stakeholders other than share-
holders in the corporation. Such hostile behavior may shed new light on 
the age-old and ongoing debate on shareholder primacy. 
A wave of hostile mergers, acquisitions, and corporate restructur-
ings in the late 1980s and early 1990s was associated with significant job 
losses for long-term workers.6 A common concern was that shareholders 
were using such changes to expropriate the rents7 of these long-term em-
ployees, as well as other stakeholders such as suppliers and creditors. 
Commentators began to argue that employees should receive greater pro-
tection in corporate law. 
For example, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s paper, A Team Pro-
duction Theory of Corporate Law,8 from fifteen years ago, provided a 
potentially paradigm-shifting analysis in the field of corporate govern-
                                                        
 1. David Gellis, Hostile Takeover Bids for Big Firms Across Industries Make a Comeback, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2014, at B1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. This Article uses “worker” and “employee” interchangeably. 
 7. In economics, a rent is any payment to a factor of production (such as labor) in excess of the 
cost of that production. Here, the rents are paid to long-term workers who have invested early in 
their careers in order to receive higher payments later on in their careers. Without the implicit prom-
ise of these rents, the investments are not made. This argument is developed below in greater detail. 
 8. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247 (1999). 
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ance. The authors argued that the classic principal–agent model does not 
reflect the production realities of corporations, providing not only a de-
scriptive analysis of the state of corporate law, but also challenging nor-
mative theories of shareholder primacy.9 
While the team production theory may never replace the conven-
tional agency theory of corporate law, Blair and Stout’s paper has been 
lauded for its theoretical coherence and robustness,10 its ability to capture 
aspects of corporate law that the agency model fails to capture,11 and its 
real-world implications for corporate governance on wealth inequality.12 
Other commentators have critiqued the extent to which “pluralist” mod-
els, such as the team production theory, should play a role in corporate 
governance and, indeed, the extent to which they do play a role.13 
I shall put to one side most of these issues and controversies for the 
purposes of this paper. My focus, here, will be on one narrow aspect of 
Blair and Stout’s paper. Blair and Stout argue that if the rents from firm-
specific investments made by stakeholders—such as employees—can be 
expropriated, this will dampen the incentive of stakeholders to make 
such investments: 
[Our] model thus lends intellectual content to the argument that 
treating directors as trustees charged with serving interests above 
and beyond those of shareholders in fact can be in shareholders’ 
“long-run interests,” because a shareholder decision to yield control 
rights over the firm to directors ex ante—that is, when the corporate 
coalition is first formed—can induce other participants in the team 
                                                        
 9. Id. at 263–65 (summary of argument). 
 10. See, e.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, Redefining the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors in 
Accordance with the Team Production Model of Corporate Governance, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
623, 624–25 (2003); Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 672–73 (2002); Robert Yalden, Competing Theories of the Corporation 
and Their Role in Canadian Business Law, in THE CORPORATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: NINTH 
QUEEN’S ANNUAL BUSINESS LAW SYMPOSIUM (Anita I. Anand & William F. Flanagan eds., 2002). 
 11. See generally Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bu-
reaucrats, 14 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 96 (2005); Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Shareholders Should 
Welcome Employees as Directors (IEW, Working Paper No. 228, 2005). 
 12. John C. Coates IV, Team Production in Business Organizations: Measuring the Domain of 
Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837 (1999). 
 13. See generally George W. Dent, Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and 
Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213 (2008); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); 
Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The End of Corporate Existence: Should Boards Act as Mediating Hierarchs? 
A Comment on Yalden, in THE CORPORATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: NINTH QUEEN’S ANNUAL 
BUSINESS LAW SYMPOSIUM 37 (Anita I. Anand & William F. Flanagan eds., 2002); Alan J. Meese, 
The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1629 (2002); David Millon, New Game Plan or Business As Usual? A Critique of the Team Produc-
tion Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2000). 
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production process to make the kind of firm-specific investments 
necessary to reap a surplus from team production in the first place.14 
This idea has intuitive appeal. There is a holdup problem arising 
from the corporation’s inability to provide complete contracts over the 
employees’ investment.15 In particular, if the rents generated by this in-
vestment are susceptible to expropriation, the employee will have less 
incentive to invest in, and add value to, the firm. An employee will only 
invest if she knows that the firm will reward the increased productivity. 
I explore this idea further in the specific context of hostile takeo-
vers. Hostile takeovers, if permitted by law, can lead to expropriation of 
workers’ rents. Consequently, if the law is permissive of hostile takeo-
vers, workers may be less willing to invest their time and effort in firm-
specific activities. Some form of compensation is therefore required to 
resolve the problem. But how much compensation should be given? And 
on what basis should it be awarded? 
My goal here is modest. I use a familiar argument from the contract 
law literature to demonstrate that there is no simple ex post compensation 
scheme that will generate both efficient takeovers by outside bidders and 
efficient investment by employees. Importantly, a compensation scheme 
that fully compensates workers for the value of their firm-specific in-
vestment will generate the opposite problem to the one we started with. 
That is, compensation schemes may result in too much investment in 
firm-specific investments by employees. Following from the literature on 
contracts, I call this problem one of “overreliance.” 
The argument proceeds as follows. In Part II, I spell out the prob-
lem of underinvestment by employees as it pertains to hostile takeovers 
in more detail. In Part III, I argue that there is no simple ex post compen-
sation scheme that can solve both the takeover and the reliance problem. 
A compensation scheme that results in efficient takeover behavior—that 
is, a compensation scheme that is analogous to the expectation measure 
of damages in contract law—will generate incentives for overreliance by 
the employees: they will overinvest in firm specific investments. In Part 
IV, I investigate the limits of this analogy and examine how it is different 
from the idea of entrenchment that some authors have discussed. In Part 
V, I conclude by discussing the broader implications of the findings and 
suggest future avenues for research. 
                                                        
 14. Blair & Stout, supra note 8, at 305. 
 15. See generally Sanford Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: 
A Theory of Vertical Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986). 
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II. THE PROBLEM IN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: TOO LITTLE FIRM-SPECIFIC 
INVESTMENT BY EMPLOYEES 
The argument made by Blair and Stout about inducing firm-specific 
investments by members of the team production process is a more gen-
eral version of one made by Andrei Shleifer and Larry Summers in the 
context of hostile takeovers. In their paper, Breach of Trust in Hostile 
Takeovers,16 Shleifer and Summers argue that the large premia often re-
ceived by corporate shareholders after a restructuring are, in fact, partly 
evidence of a transfer of wealth from stakeholders to shareholders, rather 
than evidence of created wealth due to efficiency gains.17 While takeo-
vers can, of course, promote efficiency by reallocating resources from 
the hands of those who use resources poorly—i.e., inefficient manag-
ers—to a new group of managers,18 takeovers can also provide an envi-
ronment for shareholders to expropriate wealth from stakeholders.19 In 
particular, Shleifer and Summers argue that hostile takeovers are an ex-
ternal means of removing managers who uphold stakeholder claims, al-
lowing shareholders to engage in opportunistic behavior at the expense 
of stakeholders, especially employees.20 
Compare and contrast the following two scenarios used by Shleifer 
and Summers: 
Scenario [I:] T. Boone Pickens takes over Plateau Petroleum and 
immediately lays off 10,000 workers, who immediately find work 
elsewhere at the same wage. Pickens also stops purchasing from 
numerous suppliers, who find that they can sell their output without 
any price reduction to other customers. The stock of Plateau Petro-
leum rises by 25 percent. 
Scenario [II:] Carl Icahn takes over USZ. He closes down the cor-
porate headquarters and lays off thousands of highly paid, senior 
employees, who had previously been promised lifetime employment 
by the now-displaced managers. Icahn also shuts down factories 
that dominate the economies of several small towns. As a conse-
quence, numerous local stores, restaurants, and bars go bankrupt. 
The stock of USZ goes up by 25 percent.21 
                                                        
 16 . Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 33–68 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). 
 17. Id. at 36–37. 
 18. See David Scharftstein, The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers, 55 REV. ECON. STUD. 185, 
185–99 (1988). 
 19. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 16, at 36–37. 
 20. Id. 
 21. These are Scenarios A and C in Shleifer & Summers, supra note 16, at 34–35. 
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While both scenarios generate significant private benefits for the 
shareholders of the target firms, the net social benefits are very different. 
In Scenario I, society is better off as waste is eliminated. In Scenario II, 
society is worse off. The private benefits for the shareholders in Scenario 
II come at the expense of employees’ human capital and other stakehold-
ers. For example, in an empirical study of hostile takeovers, Joshua 
Rosett found that a wealth transfer from workers to shareholders ac-
counts for about ten percent of the takeover premium in the late 1980s.22 
Shleifer and Summers examine situations where incumbent man-
agement needs to establish a reputation of trust for employees to feel re-
warded for making firm-specific investments.23 While explicit long-term 
contracts would be the obvious solution here,24 Shleifer and Summers 
suggest that a reputation of trust must be established when contracts are 
unavailable or incomplete.25 That is, it is difficult to specify ex ante 
which investments should be made at particular points in time. If, later in 
time, employees are not subsequently rewarded for their investments, 
there is a breach of the implicit contract of trust. Given the reputational 
consequences, Shleifer and Summers argue that corporate raiders are far 
more willing than incumbents to breach an implicit contract with em-
ployees.26 The possibility of a hostile takeover, therefore, may dull the 
incentive of workers to make value-added, firm-specific investments. 
Monika Schnitzer formalized this argument in a 1995 paper.27 
Shareholder-centered models of corporate law, which often fail to 
take stakeholders’ interests into account, may be deleterious in the long 
run for both shareholders and society. The threat of a hostile takeover 
that transfers wealth from stakeholders reduces their ex ante investment. 
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny have separately argued that simply 
prohibiting hostile takeovers would not be beneficial.28  A prohibition 
would “simply throw out the baby with the bathwater,” denying the pos-
sibility of efficient acquisitions.29 Rather, 
                                                        
 22. Joshua Rosett, Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums?, 27 J. FIN. 
ECON. 263, 263–82 (1990). 
 23. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 16, at 37–38. 
 24. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985). 
 25. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 16, at 39. 
 26. Id. at 59. 
 27. Monika Schnitzer, “Breach of Trust” in Takeovers and the Optimal Corporate Charter, 43 
J. INDUS. ECON. 229, 229–59 (1995). 
 28. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process, 2 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 7, 7–20 (1988). 
 29. Id. at 19. 
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[S]everance pay and provisions to protect labor can alleviate the 
hardships of employees harmed by acquisitions and make implicit 
contracts more reliable. Shareholders of target firms should proba-
bly pay for at least some of these transfers to affect employ-
ees . . . . Provisions to help employees would also deprive embattled 
managers of one of their favorite public excuses for opposing hos-
tile bids. The way to deal with transfers that occur in hostile takeo-
vers is to compensate the losers . . . .30 
Several academics have similarly advocated for the implementation 
of labor protection provisions and worker compensation schemes to alle-
viate the negative wealth transfer effects and broad worker dislocation 
associated with hostile takeovers. For example, in a 1988 article,31 John 
Coffee argued that there might be a legitimate role for state regulation of 
takeover offers to prevent opportunism on behalf of shareholders against 
other stakeholders in the corporation.32 While Coffee primarily concen-
trates on opportunistic conduct taken by shareholders against manag-
ers—rather than employees generally—he argues that takeover control 
legislation may be valuable if it leads to more equitable sharing of takeo-
ver gains with other stakeholders.33 As such, in an argument similar to 
that advanced by Blair and Stout, Coffee suggests that the board of direc-
tors may have a mediating role to play between shareholders and other 
corporate stakeholders.34 
In the early ‘90s, Marleen O’Connor argued that the widespread 
legislative adoption of nonshareholder constituency statutes did not go 
far enough in addressing the problem of plant closings and worker dislo-
cation.35 Instead, O’Connor suggested that employees should have legit-
imate noncontractual claims against the corporation, based on the degree 
of their firm-specific investment.36 Under O’Connor’s model, boards of 
directors would be subject to a broader fiduciary duty that would include 
a legal obligation to alleviate the harsh effects on employees brought on 
by corporate changes, such as hostile takeovers. The compensation, here, 
would take the form of adequate severance payments, suitable job re-
                                                        
 30. Id. 
 31. John C. Coffee, Jr, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, 
Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435.   
 32. Id. at 435. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 448. 
 35. Marleen O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a 
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991). 
 36. Id. at 1222–23. 
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training, and other appropriate relief to displaced workers.37 O’Connor 
believed that this ex post compensation could best be identified on a 
case-by-case basis.38 Other commentators have made arguments in a sim-
ilar vein.39 
For example, Alexander Gavis has suggested using “silver” or “tin” 
parachutes, whereby employees are given explicit contractual rights to 
compensation in the event of corporate restructuring.40 In the context of 
the contractual damages analogy, providing employees with direct or 
individual compensation for the added risk of takeovers is akin to a liq-
uidated damages clause. In his paper, Gavis also advocates that employee 
stock ownership plans should be used to provide stock compensation to 
workers.41 These mechanisms are somewhat different to the ex post com-
pensation schemes that I will discuss in this paper.42 The contracts in 
Gavis’s model are explicit.43 They stipulate the precise compensation in 
the event of breach—that is, in the event of a takeover.44 Moreover, Jona-
than Macey expresses a preference for these types of private contractual 
solutions over public regulation of takeovers.45 But the problems raised 
by Shleifer and Summers—and others—are generated from the ex ante, 
noncontractible nature of the investment activity. 
Robert Howse and Michael Trebilcock propose another type of 
worker protection scheme.46 Howse and Trebilcock address the role and 
                                                        
 37. Id. at 1254. 
 38. Id. at 1254–57. 
 39. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfied, Helping the Casualties of Creative Destruction: Corporate 
Takeovers and the Politics of Worker Dislocation, 16 J. CORP. L. 249 (1991) (raising concerns that 
limitations on takeover activity only serve to entrench corporate executives in power while failing to 
protect the low-level employees who suffer the greatest degree of harm from dislocations; therefore, 
workers should be given more power to influence the allocation of corporate resources); Wai Shun 
Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime that Recog-
nizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587 (1997) (arguing stakeholders 
should be entitled to a cut of the takeover gains, suggesting that boards must consider equally the 
interests of shareholders and other stake derivative actions as the preferred mechanism); Katherine 
Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 
21 STETSON L. REV. 45 (1991) (addressing the weaknesses of measures to protect workers in labor 
legislation and other measures). 
 40. Alexander Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors’ Responsibilities Under 
State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1451 
(1990). 
 41. Id. at 1455. 
 42. See infra Part III. 
 43. Gavis, supra note 40, at 1455. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the 
Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173 (1989). 
 46. See generally Robert Howse & Michael Trebilcock, Protecting the Employment Bargain, 
43 U. TORONTO L.J. 751 (1993). 
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limits of worker participation as a response to the failure of ex ante con-
tractual bargaining to adequately protect workers’ firm-specific invest-
ments following corporate restructuring.47 The authors’ findings show 
that worker participation may be attractive in some limited circumstanc-
es; however, it often creates new conflicts of interest within the firm.48 
Other authors have used formal theoretical models to emphasize the 
role of hostile takeover defenses in encouraging firm-specific invest-
ments. For example, Charles Knoeber argues that takeover defenses such 
as golden parachutes and shark repellents can be viewed as mechanisms 
to commit the firm to deferred compensation for management, which is 
part of the implicit contract.49 Takeovers in his model are entirely exoge-
nous, so defenses in his model do not affect the stock price.50 As a con-
sequence, such defenses cannot be used to raise the price for sharehold-
ers, nor can they be used to incentivize managers.51 
In the next Part, I discuss the efficiency implications of the use of 
ex post compensation schemes for employees. These compensation 
schemes are basically analogous to damages for breach of contract—the 
takeover results in a breach of the implicit contract between the share-
holders and the stakeholders, and the ex post compensation scheme acts 
as a measure of damages. I illustrate a notable problem of trying to use 
contractual damages to remedy breach: the problem of overreliance. 
III. COMPENSATION SOLUTIONS: PLUGGING ONE LEAK EXPOSES 
ANOTHER 
A. Summary of the Argument: No Ex Post Compensation Scheme Can 
Result in Both Efficient Takeovers and Efficient Investment 
My argument starts with the assumption that underinvestment by 
workers is a particularly acute problem when there is a threat of hostile 
takeover or other hostile activity that may extract workers’ rents. For 
example, factory workers may not wish to invest time or effort learning 
                                                        
 47. Id. at 752. 
 48. Id. at 753. 
 49. Charles R. Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers, 76 
AM. ECON. REV. 155, 155–67 (1986). 
 50. In the model below, the corporate raider’s valuation of the target company is exogenously 
given. The probability of takeover, therefore, is a function of the level of compensation that must be 
made to workers in the event of hostile takeover. 
 51 . See Gilles Chemla, Hold-Up, Stakeholders, and Takeover Threats, 14 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 376, 376–97 (2005) (examining a bilateral hold-up problem where stakeholders 
also appropriate a fraction of the value created by bidder. In his model, stakeholders continue to 
underinvest in all situations). 
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to use machines that are only used by their employers, knowing that the-
se skills are not transferrable in the broader market. The underinvestment 
in firm-specific investments by employees means that the firm does not 
reach its optimal value. Of particular interest is how to remedy this un-
derinvestment. 
I approach the problem from a slightly different perspective than 
the prior literature described above. I argue that the ex post compensation 
awarded to workers following a hostile takeover—or other expropriating 
activity—can be thought of in the same way that we think of contractual 
damages. Traditionally, when a contract is breached, the nonbreaching 
party is entitled to damages. Such contractual damages compensate for 
the breaching party’s failure to uphold their end of the bargain. In a simi-
lar vein, a hostile takeover results in a breach of trust, which is essential-
ly nonperformance of an implicit contractual term. The compensation 
schemes described by Shleifer, Vishny, and Knoeber, therefore, can be 
thought of as damages: an amount of money paid by a defaulting party to 
the innocent promisee. In the context of our situation, the innocent prom-
isees are employees who have invested in the firm. 
As noted in the Introduction, my goal here is modest. I will use a 
familiar result from the law and economics literature on contract law to 
illustrate that, under plausible scenarios, there is no compensation 
scheme that, by itself, can both encourage efficient takeovers by outside 
bidders and efficient investments by employees. 
Essentially, in trying to find a solution to one problem, another un-
expected problem arises. Specifically, by trying to both incentivize effi-
cient takeovers and encourage optimal value-enhancing investment activ-
ity by workers, we may find ourselves encouraging excessive firm-
specific investment activity by workers. 
I will first spell out the argument in the contracts literature. I will 
then illustrate the analogy between contractual damages and the compen-
sation for breach of trust in the hostile takeover context. In the Part that 
follows, I will discuss those aspects of the model where the analogy 
breaks down and where the model fails to capture the essence of the 
problem discussed by Blair–Stout and Shleifer–Summers. 
B. Shavell on Contractual Damages 
In a famous 1980 paper,52 Steven Shavell found that there is no 
measure of damages that can encourage both efficient breach and effi-
cient investment in the relationship (or “reliance”). To quote Shavell: 
                                                        
 52. Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980). 
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“There does not exist a damage measure which leads to Pareto efficient 
decisions concerning both breach and reliance . . . . [I]n other words, 
there is no damage measure which acts as a perfect substitute for com-
plete contingent contracts.”53 
Notably, Shavell finds that expectation damages—putting the non-
breaching party in a position as though the contract had been per-
formed54—will promote efficient breach behavior by implicitly forcing 
the breaching party to internalize the losses that the breach would impose 
on the other party.55 Efficient breach characterizes the situation when it is 
more efficient for a party not to perform the obligation under the contract 
rather than to perform. 
Despite the gains in social efficiency that expectation damages gen-
erates, Shavell finds that measures of expectation damages result in 
promisees choosing a level of reliance that is greater than the Pareto ef-
ficient level of investment.56 The reason for the overinvestment is that 
promisees act as though they are fully insured against the negative con-
sequences of a breach of contract, and as such, do not fully factor in the 
likelihood that their investments may be wasted.57 
An example will help illustrate this argument. Consider the follow-
ing contract for the sale of a car. A agrees to sell a car to B for $1,000. B 
pays the $1,000 up front, and A agrees to deliver the car one week later. 
The initial value of the car to B is $1,000. During that week, the buyer B 
makes a reliance investment specific to the car. Let’s say B has two pos-
sible options for investing. The first is to invest nothing. The second op-
tion is for B to invest in new wheels for $200, raising B’s value of the car 
to $1,300 (an additional $300 return for a $200 investment). 
Between the date of payment and the date of delivery, a second 
buyer, C, may offer his value of the car, $1,500, to A. Assume that there 
is a 50% chance that C will value the car at $1,500, but zero otherwise. 
Assume that C gets no benefit from the investment of the new wheels. A 
will be willing to sell the car to C provided that the cost of breaching the 
contract—the measure of damages that he must pay to B—does not make 
this new trade unprofitable. If an expectation measure of damages is used, 
then A will breach the contract with B if the value to C is greater than B’s 
valuation of the car (i.e., when C values the car at $1,500). Under these 
                                                        
 53. Id. at 472. 
 54. Expectation damages are the measure of damages most commonly used by courts in com-
mon law countries. 
 55. See Shavell, supra note 52, at 483. 
 56. Id. at 478. The Pareto efficient level of investment is defined as the level of investment that 
leads to maximization of the sum of the expected values of the contract to the buyer and to the seller. 
 57. Id. 
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circumstances, the car will be allocated to the person who values the 
goods the highest; that is, there is efficient breach and efficient perfor-
mance. 
While the measure of expectation damages does incentivize effi-
cient breach, the level of reliance investment by the buyer B will be ex-
cessive. While it may seem optimal for the buyer B to make the addition-
al investment in the new wheels (since the additional $200 investment 
increases the value by $300), this conclusion is incorrect. This increase 
in social surplus only occurs if the contract between A and B is completed. 
If the contract is not completed—that is, if the second buyer C values the 
car at a higher value than B—then the additional reliance investment by 
B is wasted. If the breach decision is efficient, there is only a 50% chance 
that B will end up with the car. While the additional $200 investment by 
B is certain, the $300 return is only likely to occur with 50% probability. 
The expected return on investment for society is only $150. That is, the 
investment is socially wasteful. 
While socially wasteful, the investment is privately optimal to B in 
a world of expectation damages. Under expectation damages, the $200 
investment will always generate a private return of $300 to B. B will ei-
ther receive the car (with a probability of 50%) or she will receive an 
amount of money equal to her value of the car. Because the expectation 
remedy essentially guarantees that B will receive the return on invest-
ment, B will make privately optimal—but not socially optimal—
investment decisions. 
The takeaway is that a measure of damages that protects the expec-
tation interest will generate efficient breach but incentivize too much 
investment by the buyer. Similarly, in the hostile takeover context, com-
pensation that rewards employees for the expected value of their invest-
ments will result in efficient takeover behavior but will incentivize too 
much investment by workers. 
An efficient takeover is one where value or wealth is created (as in 
Scenario I above); in contrast, an inefficient takeover destroys social val-
ue (as in Scenario II). Under an ex post compensation scheme that re-
flects workers’ expectation interest, destructive takeovers will be dis-
couraged, as corporate raiders will no longer find it valuable to engage in 
takeover activities that merely result in a transfer of wealth away from 
corporate stakeholders. The analogy with Shavell’s analysis on contrac-
tual damages, however, suggests that compensating employees according 
to their expectation interest will result in employees overinvesting in 
their relationship with the firm. Thus, from the perspective of firm-
specific investment, compensation measures lead to precisely the oppo-
site problem than the one that the above-noted commentators are con-
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cerned about. That is, we get excessive investment by employees in the 
firm. 
C. Analogy to Hostile Takeovers with Compensation 
In this section, I illustrate what happens when workers receive 
compensation if their rents are expropriated during a hostile takeover. I 
draw heavily on Shavell’s model of contractual damages, with some mi-
nor modifications and a number of simplifications. First, I will provide 
some preliminaries and a description of the timing of the model. Let us 
assume that all players here are risk neutral. Workers and firms contract 
in period one. For simplicity, we assume that at the time of contracting, 
the exact type of investment required by the workers is not known. Firms 
and workers, therefore, cannot contract on the investment at the time of 
contracting, but the workers may trust the firm. In a situation where the 
workers trust the firm, workers invest in firm-specific investments in pe-
riod two. Workers and firms implicitly contract over the wages that will 
be paid to workers in subsequent periods. The implicit contract will re-
ward workers who stay with the firm for their investments later in their 
careers. The more that workers invest in the firm, the greater the value of 
the firm. But the more they invest in firm-specific skills and knowledge 
on the basis of trust, and trust alone, the more they risk loss from expro-
priation by outsiders. 
At the start of period three, the value of the firm under current man-
agement is realized. While the model abstracts away the explicit behav-
ior of management, the relative effectiveness of current management is 
reflected in how an outside bidder might view the firm. An outside bid-
der can accurately ascertain the value of the firm and determine how 
much of the workers’ rents can be expropriated should they take over the 
firm. I assume that for reasons of personal reputation, management will 
not agree to a takeover, and thus, the takeover is hostile. After succeed-
ing in the hostile takeover, the acquirer replaces the prior management, 
breaches the implicit contracts between the workers and the incumbents, 
and expropriates the value stakeholders have created. 
How, then, do we compensate workers ex post (if at all) for this 
breach of implicit contract? Shavell’s paper analyzes two situations of 
contractual breach: in the first, one party decides about reliance and the 
other party decides about breach;58 in the second, both parties decide 
about both their reliance investments and the decision to breach or per-
                                                        
 58. Id. at 473–83. 
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form.59 In this paper, I need only consider those situations in which the 
workers make an investment and the firm breaches the implicit contract. 
I do this for two reasons. First, since the focus of this paper is on the po-
tential for underinvestment by workers when there is a threat of hostile 
takeover, the effect is easiest to analyze when we only have investment 
by one party. Second, given that I am focusing on takeover as a breach of 
trust, it is logical to examine situations in which the worker is the inno-
cent or nonbreaching party. Here, the worker does not breach the implicit 
contract. 
Let us now explore the key aspects of Shavell’s model, noting the 
similarity of his model to the breach of the implicit contract resulting 
from a hostile takeover. Rather than repeat the mathematics of Shavell’s 
article in full, I shall merely reduce Shavell’s formal theory to the intui-
tion. Interested readers are directed to Shavell’s work for the formal 
model. 
Reliance: In Shavell’s model, the investment made by the innocent 
promisee is referred to as “reliance.”60 In other words, the promisee relies 
on the contractual promise and invests in the relationship. This is repre-
sented by r, where r > 0. Shavell’s model endogenously determines the 
level of reliance. That is, the promisee determines how much to invest in 
the contractual relationship based on a number of factors, including the 
measure of damages available should the promisor breach the contract. I 
shall refer to the firm-specific investments made by the workers as reli-
ance investments. And workers implicitly rely on management to com-
pensate them in the future for such investments. 
Contingency: The contingency is an event that occurs after the con-
tract has formed, but before performance of the contract. In Shavell’s 
model, contingency can be variously interpreted.61 One possible interpre-
tation, similar to the example of the sale of a car above, is that the con-
tingency is an exogenously determined value of an outside bidder for 
product in the contract. In our example with the sale of the car, C was the 
outside bidder. In Shavell’s model, the outside bid is exogenously deter-
mined.62 Another way to interpret the contingency might be as the exog-
enously determined costs of production for the promisor. For example, 
say that X contracts to purchase a desk from Y for $200. At the time of 
contracting, Y expected the desk to cost $100 to produce. Prior to produc-
tion, however, the costs of desk materials exogenously increased to $300. 
                                                        
 59. Id. at 484–87. 
 60. Id. at 470. 
 61. Id. at 474. 
 62. Id. 
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In Shavell’s model, the contingency occurs with some positive probabil-
ity p.63 
In the context of hostile takeovers, we can think of this contingency 
in a straightforward way. The contingency here determines the value of a 
third party over the assets of the target firm. Therefore, the third party 
might become a bidder for the assets should its valuation be sufficiently 
high.64 
Breach set: Shavell defines the breach set as the set of contingen-
cies in which the contract will not be performed.65 In the context of take-
overs, the breach set is simply the set of all contingencies in which a 
third party benefits by purchasing the assets of the target, triggering a 
breach of the implicit contract between the incumbent and the workers. 
The breach set—in both Shavell’s model and my analogy—is endoge-
nously determined. 
Shavell examines how different measures of contractual damages 
affect both the amount of reliance investment by the promisee and the 
efficiency of the breaching behavior of the promisor.66 Each party max-
imizes their own expected position taking into account the possibility 
that the contract will be breached. The level of reliance and the breach 
set, therefore, are determined by the Nash equilibrium behavior of the 
two parties. Similarly, in the context of hostile takeovers, workers will 
make firm-specific investments, r. But the decision to invest will be tak-
en factoring in the probability of a hostile takeover. 
A Pareto efficient, complete contingent contract maximizes the sum 
of the expected values of the contract to both parties. In such a contract, 
there is both efficient breach and efficient reliance. Shavell defines effi-
cient breach here in the usual context: default in a contingency occurs if 
and only if it would raise the sum of the values enjoyed by the parties, 
taking into account the value of the new party’s bid.67 Efficient reliance 
is the level of reliance that maximizes the size of the total pie, net of in-
vestment costs. 
Let us proceed to consider compensation for workers for the irre-
versible firm-specific investments they made in period two. This com-
pensation, I argue, is analogous to the measure of damages in Shavell’s 
model. Shavell defines damages, d, as the damage measure determining 
                                                        
 63. The function p(.) is differentiable and given exogenously. 
 64. Again, I adopt the same general terminology as Shavell’s model. 
 65. Shavell, supra note 52, at 472–73. 
 66. Id. at 482 (Proposition 5). 
 67. Id. at 475. 
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how much the breaching party pays to the innocent party.68 In Shavell’s 
model, this could be a function of the contract price, the reliance invest-
ment made, or the values enjoyed by the promise under both breach and 
performance.69 I define compensation, c, equally simply. It measures the 
amount paid to the workers following a hostile takeover that expropriates 
their rents. The exact value of the compensation and its source will be 
discussed below, but in the meantime, it is sufficient to say that workers 
are compensated for their investments that were not explicitly contracted 
for. Following a description of the damages measure in Shavell’s model, 
I shall assume that the compensation is not a function of the contingency 
itself, but rather of the breach. In the context of my analysis, this means 
that the level of compensation paid to the workers is not explicitly tied to 
the third-party value of the firm. 
The equilibrium behavior of the parties can now be characterized 
under different measures of compensation. First, I will spell out what 
happens in the analogy when there is no compensation given to workers 
for making firm-specific investments early in their careers. This is the 
equivalent of having no damages for breach of contract. The findings are 
intuitive. Second, I shall discuss the analog of the expectation measure of 
damages. While this measure generates Pareto efficient takeovers (i.e., 
efficient breach by promisors), it also encourages overinvestment by 
workers (promisees). Third, I shall discuss other measures of compensa-
tion, highlighting the fact that there is no measure of ex post compensa-
tion that can encourage both efficient takeover behavior and efficient 
reliance by employees. 
(i) No Ex Post Compensation Given 
Although Shavell begins with an analysis of expectation damages, 
we should first understand what happens in a world with no compensa-
tion. In my analogy, nothing prevents or dissuades attempts at hostile 
takeovers. Therefore, in the event a firm breaches its implicit obligations, 
shareholders can expropriate the rents accrued from any reliance invest-
ment made in earlier periods. This high likelihood of breach generates 
two highly intuitive findings: 
1. We will observe too many (inefficient) hostile takeovers. This 
finding fits comfortably with the natural analog of Shavell’s 
finding that, in a world with no damages, breach of contract 
                                                        
 68. Id. at 476. 
 69. Id. 
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will occur too often.70 In the context of hostile takeovers, the 
ability to expropriate the rents of the workers means that the 
corporate raiders can acquire firms at a lower price than is so-
cially optimal. These acquisitions, however, will not generate 
allocative or productive efficient situations. The breach set is 
suboptimally large. That is, takeovers occur more often than 
would be Pareto efficient. 
2. Under these circumstances, workers will not undertake a so-
cially efficient amount of firm-specific investment. It is clear 
from this model that workers largely view firm-specific in-
vestments as an investment that only pays off if no takeover oc-
curs. Therefore, in a world where the workers receive no re-
ward for their investments, they will fail to invest optimally. 
The implications of a world without compensation is a central con-
cern of Shleifer and Summers (and of Blair and Stout).71 In a world 
where no compensation accrues to workers in the event of a hostile take-
over, we will observe too many hostile takeovers and too little invest-
ment by workers. 
(ii) Expectation Measure of Ex Post Compensation 
We turn now to compensation that reflects the “expectation” of the 
workers. The expectation measure aims to put the innocent party in the 
position he or she would have occupied had the contract been performed. 
Shavell’s model proposes that the expectation measure of damages will 
result in conditional efficient breach.72 That is, the breaching party will 
only breach the contract if it is socially optimal to do so. In the context of 
an alternative higher bidder, the breach will only occur if it is socially 
efficient from an allocative perspective. Similarly, in the context of con-
tingent production costs, the breach will only occur if production is no 
longer socially efficient. 
To put this in the context of a hostile takeover, the breach of the 
implicit contract will only happen when the shareholders’ gains exceed 
the workers’ “expectancy.” If, in the event of a takeover, bidders must 
compensate workers for the full value of their expectation, they need to 
factor this additional cost into their hostile takeover bid. Shareholders 
will therefore internalize this additional cost. Essentially, a compensation 
                                                        
 70. Id. at 481. 
 71. See supra Parts I and II. 
 72. Shavell, supra note 52, at 478 (Proposition 2). 
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scheme that reflects the expectation measure will take the social conse-
quences of the takeover into account. 
This analysis indicates that an ex post compensation scheme in 
which workers’ expectations are fully realized will generate efficient 
takeovers. The breach set is optimal: only those takeover bids in which 
the value of the outside bidder is sufficiently high will result in takeovers. 
Those situations in which the outside bidder tried to merely generate pri-
vate (but not additional social) value by expropriating wealth will not 
result in takeovers. 
The efficient takeover—or efficient breach—aspect of this story is, 
indeed, a positive one. Unlike the world with no compensation, this poli-
cy of compensating workers the full value of their expectation means that 
a takeover will only occur when the outside bidder has a higher valuation 
of the assets than the incumbent. Therefore, a bid only takes place when 
the reallocation of assets is socially efficient. That is, if we are concerned 
about the expropriation of employees’ rents, we can avert the problem of 
socially inefficient hostile takeovers by requiring shareholders to com-
pensate employees. 
There is, however, a less positive angle to this story. Indeed, by 
plugging up one leak, we expose another. By finding a solution to our 
efficient takeover story, we generate a different problem. Instead of be-
ing concerned about underinvestment by workers, we should now be 
concerned about overinvestment. Shavell finds that expectation damages 
for breach of contract will encourage reliance investments that exceed 
the Pareto efficient level.73 The reliance investment, r, is chosen to max-
imize a function where—irrespective of whether a breach occurs—the 
promisees receive the full expectation value of their investment. Shavell 
shows that under sensible conditions74 the promisee chooses a level of 
reliance, re, that is greater than the socially optimal level of reliance, r*.75 
The reason for this overreliance by promisees follows logically. In 
a world that fully compensates promisees for their reliance, promisees do 
not take into account the possibility of breach. Instead, they act as though 
they are insured against the potential losses that might accrue in the event 
of an efficient breach. As a result, if workers are compensated for the 
expectation value of their firm-specific investments, they will overinvest 
in such investments. What does such overinvestment look like here? One 
possible problem that may be created is that, rather than investing in their 
                                                        
 73. Id. 
 74. The result holds under the usual assumption of diminishing returns to the buyer’s invest-
ment. See id. 
 75. Id. 
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human capital more generally, workers might choose to invest too heavi-
ly in investments that are valuable only in the context of the firm. For 
example, workers might pour their efforts into learning processes that 
have little value in the broader working environment. From a social per-
spective, this may be seen as a misallocation of investment in human 
capital. 
Shavell’s proposition that expectation damages will result in over-
investment by workers (promisees) illustrates a general result of trying to 
control too many variables at once with just one instrument.76 We wish to 
generate both efficient takeover behavior and efficient investment behav-
ior. While a compensation scheme that protects the expectation interest 
of the employees may help generate efficient takeover behavior, we are 
exposed to the opposite problem from which we started: workers will 
overinvest. The overreliance by workers in firm-specific investments will 
be reflected in other measures of compensation. 
(iii) Reliance Measure of Ex Post Compensation 
Shavell also discusses that the reliance measure would provide for a 
damages measure that compensates the promisee for the amount of in-
vestment made in reliance on the performance of the contract.77 In the 
context of a hostile takeover, the workers would be compensated for the 
monetary value of their investments, not the expectation value of those 
investments. 
Shavell finds that protecting the reliance interest leads to a different 
problem.78 As with the no compensation story, breach occurs more often 
than would be Pareto efficient.79 As with the expectation story, however, 
the level of investment made by the promisee is too great.80 In the con-
text of hostile takeovers, neither problem—that is, neither the problem of 
inefficiently frequent takeovers, nor the problem of inefficiently low reli-
ance investment—can be solved by using a compensation measure that 
reflects the reliance interest. When we compensate by protecting the reli-
ance interest, we see too many takeovers because the costs generated by 
the potential expropriating of workers’ rents is not fully taken into ac-
                                                        
 76. Id. 
 77. In their classic 1936 article, Fuller and Perdue discuss three interests that contract law may 
seek to protect: the restitution interest, the reliance interest, and the expectation interest. Lon Fuller 
& William Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). Cooter and 
Ulen also discuss the opportunity interest, but we will not address this here. See generally ROBERT 
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2011). 
 78. Shavell, supra note 52, at 479 (Proposition 3). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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count by the corporate raiders. Additionally, the compensation scheme 
encourages workers to overinvest in firm-specific investments. 
Shavell finds the expectation measure to be Pareto superior to the 
reliance measure.81 In other words, rather than “repaying” workers for 
their value of their reliance investments, it is socially beneficial to “re-
ward” workers for the expectation value of their reliance investments. 
Nonetheless, while the expectation measure of compensation is superior, 
it still generates a problematic solution of too much firm-specific invest-
ment. In the next Part of the paper, I will address aspects of this model 
that do not necessarily comport with the reality of compensating workers 
following a hostile takeover, noting the real-world differences between 
contractual damages and compensating employees for expropriated rents. 
IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE COMPENSATION–DAMAGES ANALOGY 
In this Part, I will briefly consider limitations of the compensation–
damages analogy. First, I discuss the possibility of ex post renegotiation. 
Second, I look at some of the practical differences between Shavell’s 
measures of damages and compensation paid to workers in the event of a 
hostile takeover. Third, I distinguish the argument of overreliance pre-
sented here and the argument of managerial and worker entrenchment in 
existing literature. 
A. Ex Post Renegotiation 
A common result in the law and economics literature indicates that 
the problems discussed above evaporate in a world with costless renego-
tiation. Shavell’s model does not allow for the possibility of renegotia-
tion after the parties recognize the possibility of nonperformance. If it 
were costless for the buyer to negotiate with either the seller or the new 
buyer, then a simple Coasian analysis would dictate and result in the ef-
ficient solution irrespective of the default remedy chosen in law.82 Simi-
larly with hostile takeovers, even though the breach here is a breach of 
trust, if the workers could costlessly renegotiate with either the old 
shareholders or the new outside bidders, a more efficient solution could 
be reached. 
Some commentators have made the point, however, that while ex 
post renegotiation will generate efficient breach, it is not necessarily a 
panacea to all contracting problems. For example, Richard Craswell 
                                                        
 81. See id. at 482 (Proposition 5). 
 82. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also A. 
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 31–34 (3d ed. 2003). 
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notes that ex post negotiation “comes too late to correct any distortion in 
these [reliance] decisions.”83 That is, these reliance decisions differ great-
ly from the types of situations that are covered by mitigation of loss in 
contract law.84 Similar points about the inability of renegotiation to cure 
overreliance have been made by Lewis Kornhauser and, more formally, 
by William Rogerson.85 Rogerson’s analysis illustrates that, in our analo-
gy, workers will still engage in too much reliance despite costless ex post 
renegotiation if they can negotiate for an amount greater than the com-
pensatory level. 
But, even if costless renegotiation were a cure-all, the likelihood of 
such a frictionless world of dickering is low. Negotiation is rarely cost-
less. Instead, workers fail to invest in the firm at an optimal level because 
it was not possible for the workers and the firm to explicitly contract 
over initial investment with the firm. Even when negotiation is not costly, 
there are numerous explicit ex ante contracting mechanisms that could be 
used to solve this problem.86 The ex post negotiations might create the 
same types of transaction costs (e.g., negotiation over worker invest-
ments going forward), or they may be different types of transaction costs 
(e.g., coordination problems with multiple workers). For our purposes, 
the likelihood of costly renegotiations between workers and new man-
agement, especially following a hostile takeover bid, is not negligible. 
B. Practicality and Compensation for Employees 
There are, of course, a number of practical differences between the 
damages measures discussed in Shavell’s model and my proposed types 
of ex post compensation for displaced employees. While there are some 
                                                        
 83. Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 658 (1988). 
 84. Courts require an innocent promisee to mitigate their own losses following a breach of 
contract. Contract law will not compensate for wasteful expenditure after a breach. To be clear, the 
wasteful expenditures described here all occur before the breach. Shavell does not discuss whether 
the overreliance in his model should be considered a “waste” that should be mitigated or something 
the courts should take into account in assessing damages. A corollary of Shavell’s model, however, 
is that if the overreliance is taken into account, and damages were lower than the compensatory level, 
the level of breach would be socially excessive. That is, we would have inefficient breach. See, e.g., 
id. at 657–59; Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 32 (1985); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward 
a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 973–75 (1983); Donald A. 
Wittman, Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and 
Related Doctrines in the Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 77–78 (1981). 
 85. Lewis Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 683, 707–08 (1986); William Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for 
Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39 (1984). 
 86. See, e.g., Gavis, supra note 40; Macey, supra note 45. 
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difficulties in applying Shavell’s model of expectation damages to real 
contracts cases, the metric of expectation damages seems a great deal 
simpler in contracts cases than in calculating the expectation value of 
compensation to workers for their firm-specific investments. If the firm-
specific investment is not verifiable by a third party, then how can we 
provide ex post compensation to workers for their noncontractible in-
vestments? Shavell’s model rests on being able to perfectly realize the 
buyer’s value of the contract being performed,87 but this assumption is 
more difficult to reconcile with reality in the context of compensating 
workers for prior investments. The point remains, however, that even if 
we could determine the amount invested by the workers, we could not 
achieve efficient breach and efficient reliance. 
If the value generated by workers’ firm-specific investments could 
be determined, then a lump-sum payment to the workers as a whole 
could perhaps be given. But the problem of how to divide this payment 
among workers would arise. In the event that we cannot identify which 
workers actually did invest, we will end up with a free rider problem, 
where workers will not invest in firm-specific investments. This free rid-
er problem would perhaps strongly mitigate—or, most likely, domi-
nate—any potential issues of overreliance. 
C. Entrenchment 
Readers may wonder why the effect of ex post compensation ex-
plored here is not merely the same mechanism as managerial (or em-
ployee) entrenchment that can also lead to over investment by the man-
agers (or employees).88 A difference, however, exists between ex post 
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compensation and entrenchment mechanisms in that, with entrenchment 
mechanisms, managers actively try to make it more difficult to remove 
them in the event of hostile behavior.89 The entrenchment measures de-
scribed in the literature are deliberate actions on the part of management 
and workers to deliberately obstruct takeovers. In the analogy with 
Shavell’s model, workers are merely responding to their legal claim to 
compensation in the event that their implicit contract with the firm is 
breached. This is a far more passive response to the legal or political 
framework than mechanisms such as poison pills, parachutes, or—more 
relevantly here—employee ownership, which can be used as a successful 
antitakeover device, as employees often vote to maintain the incumbent 
management team when faced with a hostile takeover bid.90 
V. CONCLUSION 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production analysis from fif-
teen years ago presented a new framework for economists and lawyers to 
think about corporate law. Their analysis puts forward the argument that 
if corporate law fails to take account of other stakeholders, the likelihood 
that these stakeholders will make firm-specific investments is reduced, 
which will be inefficient in the long run. Blair and Stout’s argument is a 
broader take on a previous argument that suggests workers will not make 
firm-specific investments in the firm if their rents will be expropriated in 
the event of a hostile takeover. Commentators have suggested that work-
ers should be compensated ex post in the event of such a takeover to in-
centivize firm-specific investments. 
My paper draws on a familiar result from the law and economics 
literature of contracts to illustrate that this compensation for breach of 
the implicit contract between workers and owners is analogous to dam-
ages for breach of explicit contracts. Shavell’s 1980 paper demonstrates 
that a damages measure that encourages efficient breach and efficient 
performance will have a negative side effect: overreliance. Here, in the 
context of takeovers, attempts to cure the problem of too little investment 
by workers with ex post compensation will lead to a problem of too 
much investment by workers. 
While my paper is narrow in its focus, it divines two broader points.  
First, while this paper has focused on hostile takeovers and their effect 
                                                        
 89. See sources cited supra note 88. 
 90. See, e.g., Nicholas Auburt, Andre Lapied & Patrick Rousseau, Employee Ownership: Man-
agement Entrenchment vs. Reward Management (May 21, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), availa-
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on employees, my broader points relate to any relationship of trust where 
shareholders can breach the implicit contract and expropriate the stake-
holders’ rents. While some of these relationships will undoubtedly rely 
heavily on explicit contractual provisions to allay stakeholders’ concerns 
and perhaps dissuade hostile bidders (e.g., change of control provisions 
in credit agreements),91 frictions remain that contracting might not be 
able to solve. Further, the expropriation of rents here need not be as a 
result of a hostile takeover. Other activist measures that seek to put the 
shareholder first at the expense of other stakeholders may have a similar 
effect of disincentivizing firm-specific investments.92 
Second, my narrower point made here in this paper does not appear 
to have been made before. This perhaps suggests that corporate law can 
learn from the contracts literature, especially given the dominance of 
nexus of contracts theory of corporations.93 Similarly, there is still scope 
for scholars in law and in economics to learn from each other. In the 
economics literature on contracting, the papers by Shavell and other au-
thors who explore contractual damages measures are rarely mentioned.94 
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